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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HARRY W. KIRCHGESTNER, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Appellant: 
Case 
No. 7370 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated as they appeared in the 
trial court. The record pages referred to are stenciled in 
the lower right-hand corner of the page. The action in which 
the appeal is taken was brought to recover damages for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
personal injuries and was predicated upon a violation of 
the Federal Employer's Act (Title 45, Section 51, Et. Seq. 
U. 8. C. A.) and also upon the Safety Appliance Act (Title 
45, Section 4, U. S. C. A.). ·The trial court submitted to 
the jury only the issues arising under the Safety Appliance 
Act. 
STATE:MEN'T OF FACTS 
The plaintiff was awarded ·a verdict in the amount of 
Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00), upon 
which the judgment appealed from was entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. At the time 
of the accident and injuries complained of, plaintiff was 
employed by the defendant as a brakeman on its Narrow 
Gauge Railroad extending from Salida to Monarch in 
Colorado. He alleged and testified that the grab iron on 
the side of an ore car gave way as he grasped it in mounting 
the car then in motion. According to his testimony, he 
fell from the car and rolled down the mountain about twenty-
five feet, striking his back against a large boulder (R. 100• 
101). Although the train was moving at a rate of speed 
of two miles per hour (R. 102) and the car from which he 
claims to have fallen was next to the engine, plaintiff was 
able to ascend the mountain and recover a position on the 
engine (R. 135). Throughout this dramatic accident, plain-
tiff never relaxed his grasp on the detached grab-iron. The 
alleged accident occurred about 8:30 P. M., June 26, 1948. 
Plaintiff continued to perform his duties as a brakeman 
until the train returned to Salida and his shift ended about 
11:00 P. M. (R. 141-142). Immediately thereafter the 
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plaintiff contacted a Mr. Bennett, the local representative 
at Salida of the labor union to which plaintiff belonged 
and was advised by Bennett that he had a good lawsuit 
against the railroad (R. 137). Within a day or two after 
the accident, plaintiff went to the hospital at Salida, 
Colorado, maintained by the employees of the defendant, 
and consulted a Dr. Smith (R. 104). Plaintiff says that Dr. 
Smith prescribed some pills for the nerves (R. 104). He 
returned again to the hospital and some X-ray pictures 
were taken of his back (R. 104). The X-rays are marked 
Exhibits "3" and "4". On July 6th plaintiff went to Pueblo, 
Colorado, and contacted Mr. Sayger, a claim agent of the 
defendant (R. 107). He there negotiated a settlement of any 
cause of action arising out of the alleged accident of June 
26th, received from the defendant $135.00 and executed a 
general release (R. 160). This release is "Exhibit "2". He 
returned to work July 22nd and worked two days in that 
month, (Exhibit "C"). He worked eight days in August, 
eighteen days in September, four days in October and five 
days in November (Exhibit "C"). He was discharged early 
in December on account of reduction in force (R. 129). 
This action was commenced October 16, 1948 (R. 6) and 
prior to the plaintiff's discharge. He claims to have sustained 
an injury to his back as a result of a fall from the train 
(R. 1-5). He further claims that this back injury activated 
and aggravated ~'a latent osteo-arthritic condition of the 
back, hips, lumbar and sacroiliac joints" (R. 3). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant inter-
posed a motion for a directed verdict in its favor upon the 
ai1 ground that the plaintiff had compromised and settled the 
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cause of action sued upon and that the release precluded 
the defendant from maintaining the action (R. 186-189). 
The motion was denied ( R. 189) . 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS RIELIED ON 
1. The trial court erred in refusing to direct the jury 
to return a verdict in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff of no cause of action (R. 186-189). 
2. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's Requested Instruction No.2 as requested and in modi-
fying said instruction by striking the words "clear and un-
equivocal evidence" and inserting in place thereof the words 
"a preponderance of the evidence" (R. 34). 
3. The trial court erred in instructing the jury as set 
forth in Instruction No. 10 for the reason that it is not 
within the issues raised by the pleadings and there is no 
evidence to which it could be applied (R. 203). 
4. The trial court erred in instructing the jury as 
set forth in Instruction No. 8 because it permitted the jury 
to assess damages for future suffering that might probably 
be endured (R. 202-203). 
5. The court erred in permitting the plaintiff to 
testify to statements ma_de to him by Dr. Hines for the 
reason that the statements were hearsay (R. 115). 
6. The trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff 
to testify to statements made to him by Mr. Merrill for the 
reason that the same are hearsay (R. 106). 
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7. The trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff 
to testify concerning a release for the reason that the same 
is a conclusion (R. 106~107). 
ARGUMENT 
1. NO FACTS ARE ALLEGED OR ESTABLISHED 
BY EVIDENCE THAT WOULD JUSTIFY AN 
A VOIDANCE OF THE RELEASE (ERROR 
No. 1). 
For convenience we set forth below the exact language 
of the release upon which the defendant relys, omitting the 
heading and signatures : 
''IN SOLE CONSIDERATION OF the payment 
to me by THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY of the sum of 
One Hundred Thirty-Five and No/100 Dollars 
($135.00), receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
I do hereby release and forever discharge said THE 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY, from all claims and causes of 
action which I now have or may hereafter have or 
claim on account of any and all personal injuries, 
whether now known or apparent or unknown or not 
now apparent, including complications arising from 
such personal injuries, or the treatment thereof, 
for loss of services, and for loss of or damages to 
property, growing out of or resulting from an ac-
cident which occurred at or near Monarch, State of 
Colorado, on or about the 26th day of June, 1948, 
while I was employed as Brakeman; and I ~ere by 
acknowledge full payment, satisfaction and discharge 
of any and all such claims or causes of action, and 
fully understand that I can make no further claim 
against said Railroad Company even though said 
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InJuries are more serious or different than I now 
know or understand them to be. 
"I agree that the above stated amount is the 
sole and only consideration for this settlement and 
that no promise or contract, either of employment 
or of any other nature, on the part of said Railroad 
Company has been made to me. 
"I have read the foregoing release and fully 
understand the same." 
We also for convenience quote the plaintiff's reply, 
seeking the avoidance of the release, omitting only formal 
parts: 
"Admits the truth of paragraph 2 of said 
amended answer; in answer to paragraph 4 plain-
tiff alleges that the $135.00 which was paid to him 
by the defendant on the 6th day of July, 1948, was 
intended by both plaintiff and defendant to settle 
only the claim which plaintiff had at that time 
against the defendant for lost wages, suffered as a 
result of his injury; that at the time of the signing 
of the release, which defendant required plaintiff 
to execute before defendant would pay plaintiff his 
lost wages, plaintiff and defendant' both believed 
that the plaintiff had not suffered any serious per-
sonal injury and that plaintiff had completely re-
covered from the effects of his fall from defendant's 
train, which said fall is accurately and completely 
described in plaintiff's complaint on file herein; 
plaintiff further alleges that contrary to the beliefs 
of plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff had suffered a 
serious and crippling personal injury which became 
evident to plaintiff soon after the signing of said 
release and continues to the present time, which said 
injury is described in plaintiff's complaint on file 
herein.'' 
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"WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that he be 
granted relief against defendant in accordance with 
the prayer of his complaint on file herein." 
We shall assume but not admit that the validity of a 
release of a cause of action arising under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act or the Federal Safety Appliance Act 
is controlled by the law as ·declared by the courts of the 
United States. In Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany, 332 U.S. 62·5, 68 S. Ct. 296, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that a release of a cause of action arising 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act stood upon the 
same footing as a release of any other cause of action. There 
is therefore no federal law peculiar to the release of a cause 
of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to be 
considered in this case. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff 
.failed to either allege or produce any evidence of facts suf-
ficient under federal law to warrant a jury or court to 
nullify the release. 
We have set forth above, the pleading under which the 
plaintiff seeks to avoid the settlement and release of the 
cause of action sued upon. It is to be noted at the outset 
of an examination of the plaintiff's reply· that he admits by 
failing to deny that he executed a written release which by 
its terms discharged the cause of action sued upon. Ac-
cordingly no legal effect can be given to the allegation that 
the $135.00 payment made to the plaintiff on the date of 
the release was intended by both plaintiff and defendant to 
settle only the claim which plaintiff had at that time against 
the defendant for lost wages suffered as a result of his 
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InJury. What the parties intended to accomplish by the pay-
ment must be ascertained solely from the language of the 
written release. See: In re: Atwater, 296 F. 278, affirmed 
254 U. S. 423, 41 S. Ct. 150, 65 L. Ed. 339; St. L. & S. F. 
Ry. Co. v. Dearborn, 60 F. 880. 
No claim is made by plaintiff in his reply that he was 
induced to execute the release by any misrepresentation of 
fact by the defendant or by any coercion or undue influence 
exerted by the defendant or anyone else. In this state of the 
pleadings the only inquiry left open is whether the allegations 
in the reply set forth a mutual mistake of fact which would 
justify a recission of the release. The allegations of mutual 
mistake are simply that the parties believed that the plain-
tiff had not suffered any serious injury but had completely 
recovered from the effects of the fall from the train, and 
that contrary to this belief the plaintiff had suffered a 
serious injury which later became manifest and continues 
to the present time. 
These allegations are insufficient as a foundation for 
nullification of the release. They do not disclose any mutual 
mistake of an existing or past fact. The only mutual mistake 
of the parties alleged concerns their beliefs or opinions with 
respect to the future consequences of the injury sustained 
in the accident. This is not enough. 
The leading case in the Federal Courts establishing the 
conditions precedent to the right to avoid a release upon the 
ground of mutual mistake of fact is Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co. v. Wilcox, 116 Fed. 913. In that case Mrs. Wilcox 
sustained a fractured femur as a result of a fall while 
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riding as a passenger upon one of the defendant's trains. 
She settled her claim for $600 and gave the1 railroad a 
general release. The claim agent of the railroad who 
effected the settlement informed the plaintiff that her 
injuries were temporary and that she would recover from 
them in about a year. She testified that she believed 
the claim agent and relied upon his assurance in making 
the settlement. It developed that her injuries were 
permanent and in her action against the railroad she sought 
to avoid her release upon the ground that it was predicated 
upon a mutual mistake of fact. The court held that the re-
lease was binding. The question whether a general release 
could be avoided upon the ground of the mutually mistaken 
beliefs of the parties as to the future effect of a known 
injury was answered in the negative. The court said: 
"Again, it is not every mistake that will lay the 
foundation for the rescission of an agreement. That 
foundation can be biid only by a mistake of a past or 
present fact material to the agreement. Such an 
effect cannot be produced by a mistake in prophecy 
or in opinion, or by a mistake in belief relative to an 
uncertain future event. A mistake as to the future 
unknowable effect of existing facts, a mistake as to 
the future uncertain duration of a known condition, 
or a mistake as to the future effect of a personal in-
jury, cannot have this effect, because these future 
happenings are not facts, and in the nature of things 
are not capable of exact knowledge; and everyone 
who contracts in reliance upon opinions or beliefs 
concerning them knows that these opinions and be-
liefs are conjectural, and makes his agreement in 
view of the well-known fact that they may turn out 
to be mistaken, and assumes the chances that they 
will do so. Hence, where parties have knowrngly and 
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purposely made an agreement to compromise and 
settle a doubtful claim, whose character and extent 
are necessarily conditioned by future contingent 
events, it is no ground for the avoidance of the con-
tract that the events happen very differently from 
the expectation, opinion, or belief of one or both of 
the parties." (Citing numerous cases.) 
There has been no departure by the federal courts from 
the proposition announced in the above quotation from the 
Wilcox case. There has been some criticism of the dictum 
that a statement of a doctor to the effect that a patient 
will fully recover in a certain time is not a statement 
of a present fact. What was actually decided, however, 
in the Wilcox case has been followed without dissent. 
See Wilson v. Sands, 231 F. 921; McGovern v. McClintock-
Marshall Co., 269< F. 911; Denver & S. L. Ry. Co. v. Moffat 
Tunnel Improvement Dist., 35 F. (2d) 365; United States 
v. Golden, 34 F. (2d) 367; United States v. Garland, 122 F. 
(2d) 118; Pacific llfutual Life Insurance Co. of California 
v. Jacob, 87 F. (2d) 870. 
The reply was fatally defective for the additional reason 
that it contained no allegation that the release was predi-
cated upon the alleged mistaken beliefs. It must be con-
cluded from the omission of such an essential allegation 
that the mistaken beliefs of the parties played no part in 
the formation of the contract embodied in the release. In 
other words, the release would have been executed and de-
livered had the parties known that their beliefs were erron-
eous. The authorities are agreed that a mutual mistake of 
fact is without legal significance unless the contract would 
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not have been entered into if the parties had known the true 
facts. 
As pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Grymes v. Saunders, 93 U. S. 55, 23 L. Ed. 798 : 
"A mistake as to a matter of fact, to warrant 
relief in equity, must be material, and the fact must 
be such that it animated and controlled the conduct 
of the party. It must go to the essence of the object 
in view, and· not be merely incidental. The court 
must be satisfied, that but for the mistake the com-
plainant would not have assumed the obligation from 
which he seeks to be relieved. Kerr on Mistake and 
Fraud, 408; T1igg v. Read, 5 Humph. 529; Jennings 
v. Broughton, 17 Beav. 541; Thompson v. Jackson, 
3 Rand. 507; Harrod's Heirs v. Cowan, Hardin, 543; 
Hill v. Hush, 19,Barb. (Ark.) 52.2; Jouzan v. Toulmin, 
9 Ala. 662." 
The final and fatal defect in the reply lies in the failure 
of the plaintiff to tender to the defendant the consideration 
paid by it for the release. 
Whether a party seeking to avoid the release of a cause 
of action arising under a federal statute must tender the 
consideration paid to him is to be determined by the de-
cisions of the United States courts. See Ricketts v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 153 Fed. (2d) 757; Callen v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296. Under 
federal law, tender of the consideration paid for a release is 
a condition precedent to avoidance of the release. 
is'; Collett v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 81 Fed. Supp. 428; 
!{~ Grymes v. Sanders, 93. U. S. 55, 23 L. Ed. 798; Lyons v. 
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Allen, 11 App. D. C. 543; Thornton v. Puget Sound Power 
& Light Co., 49 Fed. (2d) 347. 
In the Collett case the plaintiff sued the defendant un-
der the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries. The defendant pleaded in defense 
a general release of the cause of action. The plaintiff ob-
tained an order permitting him to reply to the answer. He 
alleged in the reply that the release was obtained by fraud. 
He omitted to allege any tender back of the consideration 
paid for the release. The defendant moved to strike the 
reply. The motion was granted upon the ground that the 
reply failed to tender back the consideration for the re-
lease. The court said : 
"Since the substantive and procedural rights 
involved in an attack upon a contract of compromise 
and release in an Employers' Liability case are gov-
erned by the same general principles that apply to 
other contracts the general· principle which requires 
the return of the fruits of the contract before it can 
be attacked for fraud is applicable also. Vandervelden 
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., C. C., 61 F. 54; Patter-
son v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., D. C., 5 F. 
Supp. 595, and cases there cited." 
In Thornton v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., supra, 
the plaintiff brought suit under the Merchant and Marine 
Act to recover for the death of a seaman. The plaintiff also 
sought to set aside a general release, upon the ground that 
it had been obtained by fraud. No tender of the consider-
ation paid was set forth in the complaint. The court held 
that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Hill v. 
N. P. Ry. Co., 113 Fed. 914; Price v. Conners, 146 Fed. 503; 
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Mahr v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 170 Fed. 699; Miles v. 
Lavender, 10 Fed. (2d) 450; the Thomas P. Beal, 298 Fed. 
121, were cited and relied upon as establishing the proposi-
tion that federal law requires a tender of the consideration 
paid as a condition precedent to the avoidance of a general 
release. An examination of the cited cases will demonstrate 
that they fully sustain the decision of the Thornton case. 
Apart from the insufficiency of the pleadings, there 
was an entire failure of proof of any facts that impair in 
the least the validity of the release. 
The circumstances surrounding the execution and de-
livery of the release are as related by the plaintiff that on 
July 6th, following the alleged accident, he went to Pueblo 
and contacted Mr. M. V. Sayger, a claim agent of the de-
fendant (R. 180). He went in Mr. Sayger's office in the 
depot and after introducing himself said: "Well, Mr. Sayger, 
how about settling up with me?" "He said: (Well, let's 
see what we can do" (R. 181) .) Mr. Sayger further said: 
"Well, that would figure you about $125, wouldn't it? I 
said: "I will take $135 and that was all there was to it" (R. 
181). 
Q. What did he (Mr. Sayger) say? 
A. He said, "You drive a hard bargain." 
Q. Was anything else said? 
A. No sir. He wrote me out a check. I went 
and cashed it and went on to Denver. 
Q. Was anything said concerning your going 
back to work? 
A. No, not that I recall. He asked me how I 
felt. I said, "I feel like I could go back to work 
again." And he said, "Okeh" (R. 181). 
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Plaintiff further testified that he believed he could go 
back to work and felt that his injuries were over (R. 182). 
Mr. Sayger testlfied that when plaintiff called at his 
office in Pueblo he knew nothing about plaintiff's injuries 
except that Dr. Fuller had reported to him that plaintiff 
was physically qualified to return to work (R. 161-162). He 
asked the plaintiff about his injuries and plaintiff said he 
felt he was able to return to work but wanted to go to Denver 
and then back to Salida where he would be ready to go to 
work (R. 163). Over the objection of the defendant, counsel 
for the plaintiff was permitted to ask the question: "And 
at that time you agreed to pay him $13.50 a day for the 
ten days," to which question Mr. Sayger replied: "I used 
no formula to arrive at the amount of payment (R. 165). 
He further stated that he had no discussion with the plain-
tiff as to how much a day should be allowed and no mention 
was made of the sum of $13.50 per day in the course of the 
conversation (R. 165). 
Mr. Sayger didn't know anything about the plaintiff's 
belief except that plaintiff told him he was ready to go to 
work and wanted to settle his case (R. 167). Plaintiff re-
marked to Mr. Sayger that he had been contacted by one 
Bennet~, a switchman at Salida, who had suggested to the 
plaintiff that he claim a back injury and bring a lawsuit 
against the railroad (R. 167). 
The symptoms of any injury sustained by the plaintiff 
in the alleged accident of June 26th are wholly subjective, 
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except that Dr. White claims to have discovered a slight 
muscle spasm in the lower region of the back. There was 
no evidence of any bruise, abrasion, or other trauma. The 
record is silent concerning any torn or disheveled clothing. 
X-rays of the plaintiff's back, taken at Salida within two or 
three days after the alleged accident and those taken about 
the time the action was commenced, revealed no pathology 
that was in any way connected with the asserted fall from 
the train. He received no medical treatment except that Dr. 
Smith at the Salida Hospital recommended some pills for 
his nerves (R. 124). 
Plaintiff admitted that he completed his shift, which 
required several hours of switching work, following the al-
leged accident. He testified that he worked some following 
the accident and prior to the date of the settlement. He 
worked two full days on July 22nd and July 23rd and eigpt 
full days between August 1st and 15th, inclusive. He 
worked eighteen days in September, earning more in that 
month than in any previous month of his employment by the 
defendant. He worked four days in October and five days 
in November. He was cut off the board in December be-· 
cause of reduction in force. He admitted that the only 
reason he didn't earn more money between the date of the 
alleged accident and the date his employment terminated 
was that his seniority was so low that no work was available 
to him (R. 129). 
Whether the plaintiff actually worked any time between 
the date of the alleged accident and the date of settlement 
as admitted by him is not of controlling importance. It is 
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certain, however, that he· was not working on July 2nd 
because he was then in jail on a charge of drunkenness and 
indecent exposure (R. 130). 
It is submitted that the evidence is entirely insufficient 
to support a finding that the general release rests upon a 
mutual mistake of fact which would render it invalid. 
It is legally impossible to find in these circumstances, 
under which the release was executed, any evidence what-
ever that it was motivated by a mutual mistake of the 
parties with respect to any fact, past, future or present. 
There is no indication that at the time the release was ex-
ecuted he had sustained any personal injury of which he 
was not then aware. Nor is there any evidence of any sub-
sequent aggrevation or unexpected developments of the in-
juries, if any, growing out of the alleged accident. Plaintiff 
believed at the time he signed the release "* * * Like I 
could go back to work again." As to this belief, it was 
conclusively established to be correct. He not only was 
able to go back to work again, but was able to earn more 
money in a month than he had ever earned during his em-
ployment by the defendant. Not only did he return to work, 
but he returned as soon as work was available. He continued 
to work so long as it was available (R. 129). 
He had not been advised by any physician that he was 
or was not able to return to work, nor was he acting under 
the influence of the opinion or advice of any physician or 
surgeon. There is no proof of any change in his condition 
prior to the release and subsequent thereto. He stated that 
· the pain in his back continued from the time of the alleged 
accident up to the time of trial (R. 129). 
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With respect to the defendant, it had no knowledge 
concerning the plaintiff's condition except that both the 
plaintiff and his doctor believed that he was able to return 
to work, a belief heretofore shown to be well founded. 
There is a complete absence of any fraud, erroneous 
representation, coercion or overreaching in the negotiations 
leading up to the settlement. Plaintiff sought out the de-
fendant's claim agent in a distant city and requested a settle-
ment of his claim. He demanded and received more money 
than the claim agent had offered. He read the release and 
understood its terms. Neither he nor the claim agent was 
under the least misapprehension concerning the nature, 
character or extent of any injury sustained by the plaintiff 
in the alleged accident. They were not even mistaken about 
any future development of any injury sustained by the 
plaintiff. The federal cases are clear that the release ex-
ecuted by the plaintiff is a valid and binding settlement of 
the cause of action sued upon. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 
v. Wilcox, 116 F. 913; Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U. S. 55, 23 
L. Ed. 798; Merwin v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R., 62 F. (2d) 803; 
Rader v. Lehigh Valley Railway Co., 26 F. (2d) 73~; Sitchon 
v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 F. (2d) 830. 
Even if it be assumed contrary to the evidence that the 
parties were mutually mistaken with respect to the nature 
and extent of the plaintiff'f:! injuries, such mistake would 
avail the plaintiff nothing because it is, as a matter of law, 
immaterial and played no part in the formation of the con-
tract embodied in the release. It will be noted that the 
release discharges all claims and causes of action which the 
plaintiff then had or that he might thereafter have or claim 
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to have on account of any and all personal injuries whether 
then known or apparent or unknown or not apparent, in-
cluding complications arising from such personal injuries 
or the treatment thereof. By these statements in the release 
the parties declared emphatically that it was immaterial to 
them in arriving at a settlement whether they were or might 
be mistaken with respect to the nature or extent of the 
plaintiff's injuries. The very basis of the contract is an 
assumption that the parties may be wholly mistaken as to 
both the nature and the duration of the plaintiff's injuries 
The probability that the injuries might be greater or their 
duration longer than the parties then realized or expected 
was the very contingency that motivated the release. The 
plaintiff voluntarily and expressly assumed the risk of such 
a contingency. In view of the express written terms of the 
release, any mistakes of the parties with respect to the nature 
or extent of plaintiff's injuries were not material and did 
not induce the contract or form any basis for entering into it. 
In Sitchon v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 Fed. (2d 
Series) 830, a seaman brought suit under the Jones Act 
to recover damages for ·personal injuries. He had previously, 
in consideration of the sum of $180.00, executed and de-
livered to the defendant a general release covering any and 
all injuries and/ or illness sustained on or about the date 
of the accident and reciting that plaintiff took the risk that 
he might then or in the future have other injuries, illness 
or disabilities that he did not then know of. In the accident 
involved in the case, the plaintiff was struck on the head by 
a piece of machinery. Both the plaintiff and the defendant 
had been informed by the doctors, after careful and thorough 
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examination of the plaintiff, that plaintiff's injuries were 
temporary and consisted of only a slight concussion. After 
the release had been executed it was discovered that the 
plaintiff had received a fra~ture of the skull in the accident 
and that the fracture was certain to result in permanent 
disability. It was admitted that both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were grievously mistaken as to both the nature 
and the extent of the plaintiff's ·injuries. The court held 
that the release was valid and not subject to attack upon 
the ground of the mutual mistake of fact concerning the 
nature qr extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The court said: 
"The release here contemplated a settlement of 
claims for all present and future damages arising 
out of the accident. The settlement does not bear 
the slightest taint of fraud and if there was a mis-
take as to the nature or extent of the injuries, and 
the judge in the court below seems to have thought 
there was none, the release accompanying the settle-
ment fairly arrived at was a bar to the plaintiff's 
action. Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., 2 Cir., 103 F. 
2d 437; Harmon v. United States, .5 Cir., 59 F. 2d 
372; Spangler v. Kartzmark, 121 N. J. Eq. 64, 187 
A. 770; Cogswell v. Railroad, 78 N. H. 379, 101 A. 
145. 
"The law of New Jersey is apparently in accord 
with the result we have reached, though that fact 
is really unimportant where the question is one af-
fecting the rights of a seaman under the maritime 
law. That question is one which the United States 
courts have to answer." 
The proposition announced in the Sitchon case to the 
effect that where the release covers both known and un-
known injuries and complications from known injuries, it ~orll 
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is immaterial that the parties may have been mutually mis-
taken with respect to the character or duration of the plain-
tiff's injuries, is settled of law in the federal courts. See 
Lumley v. Wabash Railway Co., 76 Fed. 66; Haddock v. 
N01·th Atlantic and GulfS. S. Co., 81 Fed. Supp. 421; Chicago 
& N. Y. Railway Co. v. Wilcox, supra. 
II. TO A VOID A RELEASE, PLAINTIFF MUST 
PROVE MUTUAL MISTAKE BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE (ERROR No. 2). 
The defendant in its request numbered 2 asked that the 
jury be instructed that the burden rested upon the plain-
tiff to prove by clear and unequivocal evidence that the re-
lease was executed under the mutual mistake of the parties 
with respect to the recovery of the plaintiff. The court, 
however, modified the request by instructing that the burden 
rested upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence the alleged mistake of fact. 
So far as we can determine, the law of every jurisdic-
tion in this country requires a party seeking to avoid a re-
lease upon the ground that it was founded upon a mutual 
mistake of fact to prove the claimed mistake of fact by clear 
and unequivocal evidence. Certainly this the law of the 
federal courts. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 
116 F. 913; Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 16·2' F. 
(2d) 832~; Merwin v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 62 F. 
(2d) 803. 
By modifying the defendant's request the court relieved I 
the plaintiff of practically the entire burden which he was · 
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required to carry in order to avoid the release. The cases 
above cited demonstrate that it was prejudicial error to re-
lieve the defendant of this burden. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDIC-
IAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
THAT PLAINTIFF COULD RECOVER FOR AN 
AGGRAVATION OF HIS PRIE - EXISTING 
PHYSICAL CONDITION (ERROR No. 3.). 
In Instruction No. 10 the court said : 
"·Plaintiff is entitled to recover full compensa-
tion for all damages proximately resulting from the 
defective grab-iron, if any, even though his injuries 
may have been aggravated by reason of his pre-
existing physical condition, or rendered more dif-
ficult to cure by reason of his state of health or even 
though by reason of a latent disease the injuries were 
rendered more serious to him that they would have 
been had he been in the best of health. 
"In this connection you are instructed that if 
you find that the plaintiff is entitled under these in-
structions to recover damages, then plaintiff is en-
titled to full compensation for all damages proxi-
mately resulting from said defective grab-iron, if 
any, even though his injuries are more serious and 
of longer duration than they would have otherwise 
been because of any arthritic condition from which 
plaintiff may have been suffering." 
'·' ( The vice of this instruction lies in the absence of any 
evidence to which it could be applied by the jury. 
t~: There was evidence of an old osteo-arthritis involving 
the back bone, also a hernia and an injury to one of plain-h~' 
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sustained on June 26th was aggravated by any of these 
previous conditions or rendered more difficult to cure. The 
medical testimony with respect to pre-existing disease or 
conditions and the connection between them and the al-
leged fall from the train was given by Doctors White and 
Fuller. Neither of these doctors expressed the opinion that 
there was any connection between the pre-existing diseases 
and the injury complained of in this action. Doctor White 
explained that the only evidence of injury to the plaintiff 
traceable to a fall from a train was a muscle injury which 
was manifest by a spasm. He considered that the site of 
this claimed muscle injury was too remote from the site of 
the osteo-arthritis for that injury to be affected by the 
disease (R. 79-80). The most that Doctor Fuller would say 
was that there was a possibility of a connection between 
the assumed injury to the muscle and to the osteo-arthritic 
condition (R. 177-178). 
There is, of course, no pretense of any connection be-
tween the old leg injury or the hernia and anything which 
occurred to the plaintiff on June 26th. 
Nor does the testimony of the plaintiff afford any basis 
for connecting his claimed injuries with the pre-existing 
disease or condition. All of the pain, of course, originated 
on June 26th. He located the source of the pain at the poin1 
where Dr. White claims to have discovered a muscle spasm 
Plaintiff nowhere claimed that his injuries of June 26tl 
were in any manner aggravated or prolonged by his disease 
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In this state of the evidence, there was none to which 
Instruction No. 10 could have any application. That an in-
struction to a jury upon a subject concerning which there 
is no evidence is erroneous is elementary. That the error 
was prejudicial in this case is patent. There was a sharp 
conflict in the evidence as to whether the plaintiff sustained 
any injury whatsoever at the time or place claimed by him. 
His admitted activities since the alleged accident and the 
medical testimony produced by the defendant fully author-
ize it to contend that the plaintiff was a malingerer. To 
direct the jury as the court did in Instruction No. 10, 
to award the plaintiff full compensation not only for the 
injuries sustained in the claimed accident but also for ad-
ditional injuries of which there is no evidence, rendered 
it impossible for the defendant to obtain from the jury 
a just verdict. The following authorities unanimously 
condemn Instruction No. 10 and establish its prejudicial 
character: 
Tyng v. Constant Lorraine Investment Co., 37 
Utah 304, 108 P. 1109; State Bank of Beaver Coun-
ty v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612; 
Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Vajo, 41 F. (2d) 738. 
In the Houston case the Supreme Court of the United 
States said : 
"To instruct a jury upon assumed facts to which 
no evidence applied was error. Such instructions 
tended to mislead them, by withdrawing their atten-
tion from the proper points involved in the issue. 
Juries are sufficiently prone to indulge in conjec-
tures, without having possible facts not in evidence 
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suggested for their consideration. In no respect could 
the instructions mentioned have aided them in reach-
ing a just con~lusion." -
Furthermore, the instruction was not within any issue 
raised by the pleadings. There is no allegation in the com-
plaint or elsewhere that any injuries arising from the alleged 
fall have been aggravated by reason of plaintiff's pre-exist-
ing physical condition, or that such injuries were rendered 
more difficult to cure by reason of his state of health. Nor 
was any claim made that the injuries of June 26th were 
rendered more serious because of the plaintiff's lack of good 
health. On the contrary, the allegation of the plaintiff was 
I 
that the injuries of June 26th ,had aggravated the latent 
osteo-arthritic condition. In other words, the instruction 
related to a subject exactly opposite to the subject in issue 
under the pleadings. The above authorities are equally clear 
to the proposition that it is prejudicial error to instruct upon 
subject not within the issues raised by the pleadings. 
IV. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO COMPENSA-
TION FOR ALL PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT 
HE WILL PROBABLY ENDURE IN THE 
FUTURE (ERROR No. 4). 
In Instruction No. 8 the court instructed the jury in 
part as follows : 
"In determining the amount of such damages 
you are instructed that plaintiff is entitled to com-
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pensation for all pain and suffering, if any, both 
mental and physical, which he has endured since the 
time he sustained his injuries and that he will prob-
ably endure in the future * * * It is left to the 
sound judgment and discretion of the jury trying 
the case to determine from a preponderance of the 
evidence what amount is reasonable compensation to 
award plaintiff for the physical or mental pain and 
suffering which he has endured or will probably en-
dure in the future." 
This instruction authorized recovery for future pain 
an~ suffering, regardless of the uncertainty of their' ever 
being endured. If the jury considered there was a mer~ 
probability of future pain and suffering, they were required_ 
to make an award. Such is not the measure of damage for 
future pain or suffering. The plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover damages for only such future pain and suffering as 
the evidence establishes with reasonable certainty will be 
endured. In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Lindeman, 
143 Fed. 946, the court held that an instruction similar to 
the one given in the instant case constituted reversible error. 
The court said : 
"Another specification of error is that the court 
instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover for such pain and suffering caused by the 
injury as he 'may in the future suffer.' In Chicago 
& N. Y. Ry. Co. v. De Clow, 124 Fed. 142, 143, 145, 
61 C. C. A. 34, 35, 37, in which this court had oc-
casion to consider the rule applicable to this ques-
tion, it said:" 
" 'The liability for future damages for the 
wrongful infliction of a personal injury is strictly 
limited to compensation for such suffering and other 
evil effects of the act as are reasonably certain to 
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result from it. Possible, even probable, future dam-
ages are too remote and speculative to form the 
basis of legal injury. If they may or subsequently do 
result from the accident, they are but a part of that 
damnum absque injuria which reaches too far into 
the realm of conjecture to form any part of the basis 
of an action at law. Filer v. N.Y. Central R. R. Co., 
49 N. Y. 42, 45; Curtis v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 
534, 542, 75 Am. Dec. 258; Fry v. Railway Co., 45 
Iowa, 416, 417; White v. Milwaukee 'City Ry. Co., 61 
Wis. 536, 541, 21 N. W. 524, 50 Am. Rep. 154; Block 
v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 371, 380, 61 N. W. 
1101, 27 L. R. A. 365, 46 Am. St. Rep. 849; Smith v. 
Milwaukee Builders' & Traders' Exchange, 91 Wis. 
360, 368, 64 N. W. 1041, 30 L. R. A. 504, 51 Am. St. 
Rep. 912; Ford v. City of Des Moines, 106 Iowa, 94, 
97, 75 N. W. 630; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. Co. v. 
McDowell (Neb.) 92 N. W. 121'." 
See also: Southwest Brewery Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U. S. 
163 -- S. Ct. --; Daigneau v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 
153 Fed. 593; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 S. Ct. 696. 
V. THE COURT GOMMIT'T'ED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN PER1\1ITTING THE PLAINTIFF TO 
'T'ESTIFY TO TREA'T'MENT PRESCRIBED BY 
DOCTOR HINES (ERROR No.5). 
Plaintiff testified that following the settlement made 
through Mr. Sayger, he went to Denver and consulted Dr. 
Hines. Over the objection of the defendant to any statements 
made to the plaintiff by Dr. Hines, the plaintiff testified : 
Q. What did he prescribe? 
A. He told me to go down and get some kind 
* * * 
I 
I 
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Q. What did he prescribe for you? 
A. Prescribed a belt for me. 
Q. Any particular kind of belt? 
A. No, he didn't say. He just said: "Go get 
a belt for your back" (R. 115). 
There is no evidence that Dr. Hines was an agent of, 
or had any authority whatever to represent the defendant 
at the time the plaintiff consulted him. Plaintiff does not 
say that anyone connected with the defendant sent him to 
Dr. Hines or even knew that he had gone to the doctor's 
office. It follows that any statements made by Dr. Hines to 
the plaintiff or any treatment prescribed by the doctor were 
hearsay as to the defendant, and inadmissible in evidence 
in this action. It is so held in United States v. McCreary, 
105 F. (2d) 297. See also Bucher v. Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc. of the United States, 91 Utah 179, 63 P. (2d) 604. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO HiEARSA Y 
STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY MR. MER-
RILL, AND TO PLAINTIFF'S CONCLUSIONS 
CONCERNING HIS CONDITION (ERROR 
Nos. 6 and 7). 
Plaintiff stated that after seeing Dr. Hoover at the 
employeee' hospital in Salida, he went to his home in Denver. 
The following then occurred (R. 106-107) : 
"Q. How did you happen to leave Salida for 
Denver? 
MR. BAGLEY: I object to it as calling for a 
conclusion of the witness, and immaterial. 
Q. Were you released from duty? 
A. From the Salida Board, yes. 
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Q. Who released you? 
A. The trainmaster's clerk, by the name of Mr. 
Merrill. 
Q. Was that because of your physical condi-
tion? 
MR. BAGLEY': I object to that, your Honor, as 
calling for a conclusion of the witness, and incom-
petent. 
MR. KING: He knows why he was released. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
Q. Were you released because of your physical 
condition? 
A. Yes. 
MR. BAGLEY: Just a moment, your Honor. 
I move to strike that answer on the ground it is a 
conclusion of the witness, hearsay, and incompetent. 
THE COURT: Of course, it might be a con-
clusion. 
MR. KING: He knows. 
Q. (By Mr. King) Do you know why you were 
released, Mr. Kirchgestner? 
A. Certainly. 
MR. BAGLEY: I make the same objection. 
MR. KING: It isn't a matter of opinion. 
THE COURT: He can state what happened. 
Q. (By Mr. King) Tell us just exactly what 
happened concerning your leaving Salida, Colorado? 
A. Mr. Merrill released me from-
MR. BAGLEY: I move to strike that answer as 
a conclusion, and hearsay. 
MR. KING: A statement of fact. 
THE COURT: Don't make the conclusion as to 
what happened. State what happened. You went to 
Mr. Merrill, or he came to you, and what happened? 
A. Sent me to Pueblo, down there to see the 
claim agent, Sayger. 
MR. BAGLEY: I move to strike that answer 
upon the ground that it is hearsay and incompetent. 
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THE COURT: Objection overruled and the mo-
tion to strike is denied. 
Q. About what day of the month was it, Mr. 
Merrill sent you down to see Mr. Sayger? 
A. I believe it was June 25th or 6th." 
There is a complete absence of any evidence that Mer-
rill had any authority whatsoever to bind the defendant or 
represent the defendant in the matter of releasing any em-
ployee of the defendant from the Salida board. There is not 
even any competent evidence that Merrill was an employee 
or had any contractual connection with the defendant what-
soever. It is clear therefore that any statement made by 
Merrill to the plaintiff was not binding upon the defendant. 
That it was prejudicial error to admit these hearsay 
statements is established by State Bank of Beaver County 
v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, and S. W. 
Bridges & Co. v. Candland, 88 Utah 373, 54 P. (2d) 842. 
The statement of the plaintiff as to why he was released 
from the Salida board, if construed as reasons given by 
Merrill, is of course hearsay and inadmissable under the 
cases cited. If construed as a statement of plaintiff's rea-
:;. sons, it is either a conclusion or a self-serving statement. 
Under either interpretation it was inadmissible in evidence. 
:;.: 
VII. SUMMARY. 
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the reply of 
t: the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to invalidate 
0 '1-: the general release in that there was no allegation of a 
mutual mistake of an existing or past fact or that any mutual 
-: mistake of the parties was the inducement or foundation of 
ff"~ ~· 
........ 
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the release; that the reply was insufficient for the further 
reason that the plaintiff did not tender or allege that he 
had offered to return the consideration paid for the release; 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that 
the release was founded upon or induced by a mutual mis-
take of the parties with respect to either the nature, charac-
ter or extent of the plaintiff's injuries; that as a matter of 
law any mutual mistake of the parties with respect to the 
nature, extent or duration of the plaintiff's injuries was 
immaterial and was not an inducement to, or the basis of, 
the release; that for the foregoing reasons the trial court i 
erred in denyi.ng the defendant's motion for a peremptory 
instruction to the jury in its favor. 
Should the foregoing conclusions be rejected, the de-
fendant would respectfully submit that the court committed 
prejudicial error in its instructions to the jury and in ad-
mitting incompetent evidence over the objections of the 
defendant. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed with 
directions to dismiss the action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COT'T, 
BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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